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Asymmetric Price Adjustment “in the Small:” 




Analyzing scanner price data that cover 27 product categories over an eight-year period from a large 
Mid-western supermarket chain, we uncover a surprising regularity in the data—small price increases 
occur more frequently than small price decreases. We find that this asymmetry holds for price changes 
of up to about 10 cents, on average. The asymmetry disappears for larger price changes. We document 
this finding for the entire data set, as well as for individual product categories. Further, we find that the 
asymmetry holds even after excluding from the data the observations pertaining to inflationary periods, 
and after allowing for various lengths of lagged price adjustment. The findings are insensitive also to the 
measure of price level used to measure inflation (the PPI or the CPI). To explain these findings, we 
extend the implications of the literature on rational inattention to individual price dynamics. 
Specifically, we argue that processing and reacting to price change information is a costly activity. An 
important implication of rational inattention is that consumers may rationally choose to ignore—and 
thus not to respond to—small price changes, creating a “range of inattention” along the demand curve. 
This range of consumer inattention, we argue, gives the retailers incentive for asymmetric price 
adjustment “in the small.” These incentives, however, disappear for large price changes, because large 
price changes are processed by consumers and therefore trigger their response. Thus, no asymmetry is 
observed “in the large.” An additional implication of rational inattention is that the extent of the 
asymmetry found “in the small” might vary over the business cycle: it might diminish during recessions 
and strengthen during expansions. We find that the data are indeed consistent with these predictions. An 
added contribution of the paper is that our theory may offer a possible explanation for the presence of 





“In the absence of computation costs, more frequent assessments … might be optimal. However, if reflection about the attitudes of 
producers is costly, consumers will seek to economise on this type of analysis and will only carry out the required computations when 
conditions change noticeably.” (Our emphasis)                                                                                                      Julio Rotemberg (2002, p. 5) 
 
“MINNEAPOLIS (AP) – The cost of General Mills cereals such as Wheaties Cheerios, and Total is increasing an average of 2 percent. The 
price jump averages out to roughly 6 or 7 cents a box for cereals such as Chex, Total Raisin Bran and Total Corn Flakes, … which typically 
cost around $3 in the Minneapolis area, ... John French, 30, doubted he would even notice the higher prices for cereal on his next grocery 
trip. ‘A few cents? Naw, that’s no big deal,’ said French, of Plymouth, Minn.” (Our emphasis)                                                    
Associated Press, June 2, 2001, 7:20am ET (“General Mills Hikes Prices”) 
 
1. Introduction 
Do prices adjust asymmetrically? We often hear about gas prices that seem to be “rising like 
rockets … [but]… falling like feathers,”
1 or food prices, where “retail pork prices do not come down even 
if hog prices do,”
2 and “government subsidies to dairy farmers do not lower dairy product prices.”
3 There 
are many studies of asymmetric price adjustment, but as Peltzman (2000) points out, economic theory 
suggests no pervasive tendency for prices to respond asymmetrically. Indeed, we find that the existing 
literature offers only a handful of theoretical explanations for asymmetric price adjustment. Empirically, 
asymmetric price adjustment has been studied mostly with individual or industry level data.
4 Studies that 
use more macro data are scarcer. See Ball and Mankiw (1994) for a recent example of the latter. 
This paper contributes to the literature on asymmetric price adjustment in five ways. First, using a 
large weekly scanner price data from a major US supermarket chain, we uncover a surprising regularity 
in the data—there are more small price increases than decreases. This asymmetry "in the small" is found 
for price changes of up to about 10 cents, on average. The asymmetry disappears for larger price changes. 
Second, we explore the literature on asymmetric price adjustment and find that the only theory 
that can explain our findings is a menu cost model under inflation (Tsiddon, 1993; Ball and Mankiw, 
1994). If firms must incur a cost to change their prices then during inflationary periods they will make 
more price increases than decreases because of the expected inflation. Moreover, these asymmetric 
incentives may be stronger for small changes. We, however, rule out this theory as a main explanation 
because our findings hold even after excluding the observations pertaining to inflationary periods. 
Moreover, the findings we report appear insensitive to the inflation measure used (PPI or two alternative 
measures of CPI). Analyses of the individual products whose prices have declined during the sample 
period and thus are free from any inflationary trend, further confirm these findings.  
Third, we extend the theory of rational inattention to individual price dynamics to explain the 
findings. We demonstrate that asymmetric price adjustment “in the small” follows naturally from 
consumers' “rational inattention.” We argue that processing price change information and responding to 
it is a costly activity. If these costs exceed the benefits, then consumers may rationally choose to be 
                                                           
1 Octane, Vol. 13, No. 3, June 1999, pp. 6–7. 
2 The New York Times, January 7, 1999, “The Great Pork Gap: Hog Prices Have Plummeted, Why Haven’t Store Prices?” 
3 Canadian Press Newswire, December 18, 2000. 




inattentive to such price change information and therefore, not react to it. Thus, in a “small region” 
around the current price, customers might rationally choose to ignore price changes, making demand less 
elastic for those small price changes.  
For the retailer, consumers’ rational inattention to small price changes makes small price 
decreases less valuable because the consumers do not "notice" them and thus do not respond by 
increasing the quantity they purchase. However, consumers’ rational inattention to small price changes 
makes small price increases more valuable to the retailer, also because the consumers do not "notice" 
them, and thus do not respond by purchasing less. Thus, the retailer has incentive to make more frequent 
small price increases than decreases. The idea of consumer inattention, however, is limited to small price 
changes. A large price change will have more significant consequences for consumers, and therefore, 
they will be attentive to large price changes, prompting them to adjust their behavior accordingly. The 
price setters, therefore, will have no incentive to make asymmetric price adjustments “in the large.”  
Fourth, we consider another implication of rational inattention and examine its empirical validity. 
The theory of rational inattention suggests that there might be a variation in the extent of the asymmetry 
over the business cycle. In situations where consumers have more time and thus a greater opportunity to 
be attentive, we would expect to see reduced asymmetry. Similarly, in situations where consumers are 
pressed for time and thus have limited opportunity to be attentive, we would expect to see greater 
asymmetry. The business cycle might offer an opportunity—a natural experiment—to observe such a 
variation in the extent of attention/inattention and the resulting variation in the extent of the asymmetry 
because of the variation in unemployment over the cycle. During high (low) unemployment people have 
more (less) time available to be attentive, while the value of being attentive to small price changes is 
higher (lower). Higher unemployment, therefore, should coincide with greater attention and thus with 
lower asymmetry while lower unemployment would coincide with less attention and thus with greater 
asymmetry. Our 8-year sample period contains an 8-month recession period, as defined by the NBER, 
which we exploit for comparing the extent of asymmetry during the highest and the lowest 
unemployment periods. We find that our data are consistent with these predictions. 
The fifth contribution of the paper is that our theory may offer an intriguing explanation for the 
presence of small price changes, which has been a long-standing puzzle in the literature (Carlton, 1986; 
Lach and Tsiddon, 1996 and 2005; Kashyap, 1995). 
Similar to the rational inattention argument, several recent studies assume departures from full 
rationality. Akerlof, et al. (2000), relying on psychologists' studies that show that agents often ignore 
potentially relevant considerations in order to simplify their decisions, assume that when inflation is low, 
people ignore it when setting wages/prices. Rotemberg (2002) assumes that consumers assess price 





 Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Ball, et al. (2004), price setters are 
slow to incorporate macroeconomic information into their decisions. In Reis (2003, 2004), agents face 
costs of acquiring and processing information and thus update their information and re-compute their 
optimal plans only sporadically, remaining inattentive in-between the updates. In Gabaix, et al.'s (2003) 
model, agents allocate their thinking time according to option-value calculations. Caplin, et al. (2003) 
model absent-minded consumers who do not keep track of their spending.  
Models of near rationality offer two advantages. First, departures from full rationality are 
plausible and consistent with our experience. For example, we all have limited resources to spend on 
obtaining and processing information and thus treating it as an ordinary, costly good appears plausible. 
Consistent with this idea, Zbaracki et al. (2004) show that the costs of processing information and setting 
optimal price plans might be large in real settings. They document the presence of information gathering 
and processing cost for a price setter. We argue that consumers likely face similar types of costs. 
Second, near rationality may account for a wide range of observations. For example, Akerlof, et 
al.’s (2000) model successfully traces out a range of equilibrium unemployment rates associated with 
different inflation rates. Rotemberg’s (2002) model helps in reconciling two observations: (1) price 
increases antagonize consumers, but (2) we don't see sharp decreases in purchases in response to price 
increases. Woodford (2001) and Ball, et al. (2004) study monetary policy and find that their model fits 
the data well. Sims (2003) finds that his model's predictions fit macro data quite well. Reis (2003, 2004) 
studies consumption and inflation and reports improvements in the model fit. Caplin, et al. (2003) study 
consumption and offer novel explanations for the link between spending and credit card use. 
The studies listed above all focus on macroeconomic implications of rational inattention. We, in 
contrast, study the implications of rational inattention for individual price dynamics. We argue that the 
amount of information people choose to process depend on both, the cost and the benefit. Thus, the cost 
of processing and reacting to some information may exceed its benefit. Here that information takes the 
form of small price changes: agents may rationally choose to ignore them and based on this idea we 
derive the implications of rational inattention for a price setter, and thus for individual price dynamics. 
We proceed as follows. In section 2, we describe the data, followed by the empirical findings in 
section 3. In section 4, we assess the existing theories. In section 5, we develop the theory of rational 
inattention. In section 6, we study the variation in rational inattention over the business cycle. Section 7 
concludes and offers some caveats. In the appendix we formalize our arguments by offering two 








We use scanner price data from Dominick’s—one of the largest supermarket chains in the 
Chicago area, operating 94 stores with a market share of about 25 percent. Large multi-store US 
supermarket chains of this type made up about $310 billion in total annual sales in 1992, which was 
86.3% of total retail grocery sales (Supermarket Business, 1993). In 1999 the retail grocery sales have 
reached $435 billion. Thus the chain we study is representative of a major class of the retail grocery 
trade.  Moreover, Dominick’s type large supermarket chains’ sales constitute about 14 percent of the 
total retail sales of about $2.25 trillion in the U.S. Because the retail sales account for about 9.3 percent 
of the GDP, our data set is a representative of as much as 1.28 percent of the GDP, which is substantial. 
Thus the market we are studying has quantitative economic significance as well. 
We have 400 weekly observations of retail prices in 27 product categories that represent 30 
percent of the revenues, from September 14, 1989 to May 8, 1997.
5 The length of individual series varies 
depending on when the data collection for the specific category began and ended. In Table 1, we list the 
product categories along with the number of observations in each category. As the table indicates, the 
data set contains more than 98 million weekly price observations. 
The data come from the chain’s scanner database, and contains the actual prices paid at the cash 
register each week. If the item was on sale, or if the retailer's coupon was used, then the data reflect that. 
The retail prices are set on a chain-wide basis but there is some price variation across the stores 
depending on the local competition (Barsky, et al., 2003a). We use all the data available from all stores. 
 
3. Empirical  Findings 
Before presenting the findings, it is worth looking at a sample series from the data. Figure 1 
displays the actual weekly prices of Heritage House frozen concentrate orange juice, 12oz (from 
Dominick’s Store No. 78). According to our count, which we limited to price changes of up to 5¢ in 
absolute value, the series contain the following “small” price changes: 
 
(1) 1cent: 9 positive (at weeks 13, 237, 243, 245, 292, 300, 307, 311, and 359) and 6 negative (at weeks 
86, 228, 242, 275, 386, and 387); 
(2) 2 cent: 7 positive (at weeks 248, 276, 281, 285, 315, 319, and 365) and 1 negative (at week 287); 
(3) 3 cent: 3 positive (at weeks 254, 379, and 380) and 2 negative (at weeks 203 and 353); 
(4) 4 cent: 4 positive (at weeks 23, 197, 318, and 354) and 1 negative (at week 229); and  
(5) 5 cent: 1 positive (at week 280) and 1 negative (at week 302). 
 
                                                           
5 We have data for two additional categories, Beers and Cigarettes. However, because of the regulations and tax rules imposed on them, we 
do not discuss the results for these categories, although we do present their plots for the sake of completeness. See Barsky, et al. (2003a) for 




Thus, the price series contains many “small” changes—a fact that would be hard to tell based on visual 
observation of the plot. 
Below we analyze the patterns of price changes using the entire data set as well as individual 
product categories. We begin by studying the patterns of price changes for each possible size of price 
change, by calculating the frequency of positive and negative price changes in cents, 1¢, 2¢, 3¢,…, 50¢.
6 
 
3.1.  Findings for the Entire Sample Period 
In Figure 2 we plot the cross-category average frequency of positive and negative price changes, 
during the 8-year sample period. We immediately note an interesting and robust empirical regularity in 
the data: there are more small price increases than decreases. We call this asymmetry "in the small." This 
asymmetry lasts for price changes of up to about 10–15 cents. Beyond that, the two lines start 
crisscrossing each other and therefore, the phenomenon of systematic asymmetry disappears. 
In Figures 3a–3c, we plot the frequency of positive and negative price changes by product 
categories. Table 2 reports corresponding Z-tests' results from comparing the frequency of positive and 
negative price changes for each size of price change for identifying the asymmetry thresholds, i.e., the 
first point where the asymmetry does not hold. In four categories the asymmetry threshold is less than 5 
cents, and in two categories it exceeds 25 cent. In most categories, however, the asymmetry holds for 
price changes of up to about 5–25 cents. Overall, the asymmetry threshold is about 11.3 cents, on 
average. Thus, we conclude that the retail prices exhibit asymmetric price adjustment “in the small.”
7 
We should note that these findings cannot be explained by promotions or sales as promotions 
likely generate more price decreases than increases, which is opposite to what we observe. In addition, a 
temporary price reduction during a sale is usually followed by a price increase at the end of the sale 
period.
8 Price promotions, therefore, cannot produce the observed asymmetry. 
 
3.2.  Could It Be the Inflation? Findings for Low-Inflation and Deflation Periods 
A possible explanation for the above findings might be the fact that during the sample period we 
cover, the U.S was experiencing a moderate inflation, as indicated by the PPI-inflation figures reported 
in Table 3.
9 During inflationary period, we would expect to see more frequent price increases than 
decreases, ceteris paribus. One counter-argument to this idea is that if the reason for the asymmetry is 
                                                           
6 The average price at a retail supermarket is about $2.50 (Levy, et al., 1997; Bergen, et al., 2004) and therefore, considering price changes 
of up to 50¢ appears sufficient given our focus on the asymmetry in the small. We have actually calculated the price changes of all sizes, and 
found that most price changes are indeed smaller than 50¢.   
7 We have also calculated the total number of positive and negative price changes in the entire data set and found that it contains a total of 
10,298,995 price increases and 9,438,350 price decreases. Thus, in total, there are more price increases than decreases. Further, 1¢, 2¢, 3¢, 
4¢, and 5¢ increases account for 3.60%, 3.50%, 3.39%, 3.30%, and 3.20% of all price increases, respectively. In other words, 17.09% of the 
price increases are of 5¢ or less. In contrast, 1¢, 2¢, 3¢, 4¢, and 5¢ decreases account for 2.49%, 2.88%, 2.75%, 2.99%, and 2.88% of all 
price increases, respectively. Thus 14.00% of price decreases are of 5¢ or less. Thus, our findings hold proportionally as well. 
8 This has been documented for Dominick’s data by Rotemberg (2002). 




inflation, then we would see more positive than negative price changes not only “in the small” but also 
“in the large.” The data, however, do not exhibit such an asymmetry “in the large.” 
A more direct answer to this question can be given by asking whether the asymmetry we find for 
the entire sample, also exists in the data when the observations pertaining to the inflationary periods are 
excluded from the analysis. Given the large sample we have, such an analysis is indeed feasible.  
We have conducted two such analyses. The first included only those observations during which 
the monthly PPI inflation did not exceed 0.1 percent. We define this sample as the low-inflation period. 
In the second analysis, we took even a more conservative stand by including only those observations in 
which the monthly PPI inflation rate was non-positive. We define this sample as the deflation-period.
10 
According to the middle column of Table 2, for the low-inflation sub-sample, the extent of the 
asymmetry is statistically significant for price changes of up to 8.2 cents on average, with the majority of 
the thresholds falling in the range of 2–20 cents. The findings remain similar for individual categories: in 
all but one category (bath soap), the asymmetry still holds, with some decrease in the asymmetry 
thresholds. Thus, we conclude that the retail prices exhibit asymmetry “in the small” and the exclusion 
of the observations pertaining to moderate inflationary periods appear to make little difference. Moving 
next to the deflation period sample, the last column of Table 2, the threshold is 6.2 cents, on average. At 
the category level, we still find asymmetry “in the small” for all but one category, Frozen Entrees. 
In sum, the results for the low inflation and deflationary periods are similar to the results obtained 
from the entire sample. There is a decrease in the asymmetry thresholds as we move from the entire 
period to the low inflation period and further to the deflation period, suggesting that inflation might be 
playing a role in the asymmetry. However, a large proportion of the asymmetry still remains 
unexplained. 
 
3.3. Robustness  Check 
While the above analyses suggest that inflation is not the main explanation for our findings, we 
further explore the validity of this conclusion by checking its robustness using five different tests. 
 
3.3.1. Lagged  Price  Adjustment 
In the analysis above we did not take into account the fact that the retail price adjustment is not 
instantaneous. To check the robustness of our findings, therefore, we allow for lagged adjustment. The 
speed of adjustment of retail prices vary between 2–4 weeks (Dutta, et al. 2002; Müller and Ray, 2005) 
and 12–16 weeks (Bils and Klenow, 2004). Therefore, we have repeated the analysis under four possible 
lags: 4 weeks, 8 weeks, 12 weeks, and 16 weeks. The results, reported in Table 4, suggest that the 




exception being bath soups. In 99 of the 108 cases presented in the table, that is, in 92 percent of the 
cases, the asymmetry thresholds are positive with the (four-column) average of 5.95 cents. 
 
3.3.2.  Alternative Measures of Inflation 
The analysis reported so far was based on PPI-inflation. To examine the robustness of our 
findings, we use two other measures of inflation: CPI, and CPI-Chicago. The latter is useful as it covers 
the area where many of Dominick's stores operate, and thus it might be the most relevant measure of 
inflation for the retailer. In Table 3, along with the PPI inflation series, we report the CPI and CPI-
Chicago series. It is apparent that these series indicate fewer deflationary periods, which reduces the 
sample size. Nevertheless, the results remain essentially unchanged as Table 5 suggests. We observe 
asymmetry in the small in all but one category (bath soaps), with the average threshold of 7 cents. 
 
3.3.3.  Alternative Measures of Inflation with Lagged Price Adjustment 
The analysis in subsection 3.3.2 assumes completely flexible prices. To allow for lagged price 
adjustment, we have repeated the analysis with 4-week, 8-week, 12-week, and 16-week adjustment 
periods while using the CPI and the CPI-Chicago measures of inflation. The findings reported in Table 
6, suggest that for the overwhelming majority of the categories, the asymmetry in the small still holds. 
Of the 216 asymmetry threshold figures reported in the table, only in 32 cases, that is in only 14.8% of 
the cases, the asymmetry threshold is zero indicating no asymmetry. Thus, in over 85% of the cases the 
asymmetry still remains, with the average threshold of 4.6 cents.   
 
3.3.4.  First Year of the Sample Period versus the Last Year of the Sample Period 
The period from September 1989 to May 1997, is characterized by a downward inflationary 
trend. For example, during 1989−1990 (the start of our sample) the average inflation rate was 5.1 percent 
per year, while during 1996−1997 (the end of our sample), it was 2.6 percent. Therefore, if inflation is 
the main explanation for the asymmetry, then the asymmetry during the first 12 months should be 
stronger than the asymmetry during the last 12 months. The results of the comparison are reported in 
Table 7. Of the 27 product categories, six categories had no observations during the first 12 months. In 
the remaining 21 categories, we have only one category (canned tuna), where the asymmetry threshold is 
higher in the first 12 months in comparison to the last 12 months, and one category, soft drinks with 
equal asymmetry threshold. In the remaining 19 categories, that is, in over 90 percent of the categories, 
we see greater asymmetry in the last 12 months of the sample, averaging 9.1 cent in comparison to 1.1 
cent in the first 12 months. Thus, for the overwhelming majority of the cases, the asymmetry increases 
from the beginning of the sample to the end, which is inconsistent with the inflation-based explanation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           




3.3.5.  Products Whose Prices Have Not Increased During the Sample Period 
As a final check, we have identified all products whose prices have not increased during the 
sample period by comparing the average price during the first four weeks and the last four weeks of the 
sample period.
11 To identify these products, we used the list price, if it differed from the actual price, in 
order to avoid the sales' effect on the results. In conducting the asymmetry analysis, however, we use the 
actual price to make the current results comparable to the previous results. The findings reported in Table 
8, indicate that in 23 of the 27 categories, i.e., in over 85 percent of the cases, we have asymmetric price 
adjustment. Thus, even when we limit the analysis only to those products whose prices have decreased or 
remained unchanged over the 8-year sample period, we find that the asymmetry in the small still holds.
12 
Based on the analyses discussed in this section, therefore, we conclude that inflation is unlikely to 
be the main driver of the observed asymmetry in the small. 
 
4.  Existing Theories of Asymmetric Price Adjustment  
Despite economists’ considerable interest in this area, the existing literature offers only handful 
of theories—which Peltzman (2002, p. 467) argues is a “…serious gap in a fundamental area of 
economic theory.” The main theories of asymmetric price adjustment include capacity constraints, 
vertical market links, imperfect competition, and menu costs under inflation. Below we briefly look at 
each theory. 
The theory of capacity adjustment costs (Peltzman, 2002) argues that it is costly to increase 
inventory capacity. When procurement costs drop by a large amount, retailers tend to increase the 
inventory. Lower prices then move the larger volumes off the shelves. However, it is difficult to increase 
capacity. Therefore, when price cuts are substantial enough to run into the capacity constraint, the 
incentive to lower prices is reduced. When costs go up substantially, on the other hand, retailers do not 
face such capacity constraints because they now just buy less, making up the lower volumes by higher 
prices. Thus, there is no capacity constraint and therefore no disincentive to raise prices. Thus, capacity 
constraints might lead to asymmetric price adjustment. This theory, however, predicts that asymmetric 
adjustment should be observed especially for large price changes because small price changes are less 
likely to make capacity constraints binding. This is exactly the opposite of what we observe in our data.  
Similarly, theories based on vertical channel linkages (Peltzman 2002) and imperfect competition 
(Neumark and Sharpe, 1992) cannot explain simultaneous asymmetry “in the small” and symmetry “in 
the large” because we do not see noticeable changes in the market or the channel structure during our 
study. More importantly, these cannot really vary between small and large price changes. Clearly, large-
                                                           




scale changes in the market or the channel structures are too slow and infrequent to explain variation in 
adjustment across small and large price changes. Thus, although these factors could lead to asymmetry 
in general, they cannot explain the specific form of asymmetric price adjustment we document.
13 
Another possible explanation could be menu cost under inflation (Tsiddon, 1993; Ball and 
Mankiw, 1994). While the idea that menu cost may lead to price rigidity is widely accepted, menu cost 
by itself should not lead to asymmetric price adjustment. If, however, firms face inflation then they will 
undertake more price increases than decreases because of the expected inflation. Recent studies have 
documented a presence of non-trivial menu costs at retail supermarket settings (Levy et al., 1997 and 
1998; Dutta et al., 1999). However, if the reason for the asymmetry we find were inflation and menu 
cost, then we should not have seen asymmetry in periods of low inflation, and even more so in periods of 
deflation. The empirical findings discussed in section 3.2, however, suggest that the asymmetry in the 
small is present in our data during low inflation, and even during deflation periods. 
If we consider a broader notion of price adjustment costs, which might include managerial and 
customer costs (Zbaracki, et al. 2004), then price adjustment costs could lead to asymmetric price 
adjustment: the cost of price increase could be higher than the cost of price decrease. The reason for such 
asymmetry might be potential consumer anger (Rotemberg, 2002) or search triggered by a price increase. 
Also, pricing mistakes can cause consumer goodwill loss, especially if the consumers link them to price 
increase (Bergen, et al. 2004; Levy and Young, 2004). The explanation, however, predicts that we should 
see more price decreases than increases. That is opposite to what we find in our data. 
Finally, Rotemberg (2002) proposes a model which could imply asymmetric price adjustment. In 
his model, consumers assess the price change fairness and act accordingly (Kahneman, et al (1986). 
Assuming that it would be price increases, not price decreases, that would trigger such an assessment, 
firms would be more hesitant to increase prices than decrease them. This could generate asymmetric price 
adjustment. However, the asymmetry would go in the opposite direction to what we find.  
 
5.  Rational Inattention and Asymmetric Price Adjustment “in the Small” 
Given the inability of existing theories to explain our findings, we offer an extension of theories 
of rational inattention as an explanation for the asymmetric price adjustment “in the small.” We argue 
that it may be rational for consumers to be “inattentive” to information on small price changes if 
processing and responding to such information is costly. Therefore, asymmetric price adjustment in the 
small may be the outcome of the retailers’ optimal reaction to their customers’ “rational inattention” to 
small price changes, and rational attention to large price changes. In this section we discuss the idea of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
12 We obtained similar results after repeating the entire analyses for price changes in relative terms, i.e., by considering the frequency 
distribution of positive and negative price changes in percents (1%, 2%, …, 50%) rather than in cents. We do not report them here for the 




rational inattention from consumers’ and producers’ perspective and derive its implications.  
 
5.1. Rational  Inattention 
We draw from a body of a work which studies the idea of rational inattention under the label of 
information processing or re-optimization costs. The idea of rational inattention follows naturally from 
these information-processing requirements and the scarcity of the resources needed to process them, as 
the opening quotes suggest.
14 Urbany, et al. (1996) echo Samuelson and Zeckhauser’s (1988, p. 35) 
claim that in the context of retail shopping, “… it may be optimal for individuals to perform an analysis 
once, as their initial point of decision, and defer to the status quo choice in their subsequent decisions, 
barring significant changes in the relevant circumstances” (emphasis ours). 
We argue that it may be rational for consumers to be “inattentive” to small price changes if they 
face: (i) large amounts of information which are costly to process and react to, and (ii) time, resource, 
and information-processing-capacity constraints. It seems reasonable to argue that these resource and 
information costs are non-trivial. Calculating the optimal purchase behavior for every possible price, for 
example, is a costly process requiring time and mental resources, especially when customers are 
engaged in purchasing a basket of many—often tens and occasionally hundreds—of different goods.  
If the cost of processing information on a price change exceeds the benefit, then the customer 
might ignore and not react to the price change. This scenario is most likely for small price changes, 
because the costs of processing and reacting to small price changes might outweigh the benefits. This 
introduces a price insensitive region in the demand curve, as shown in Figure 4.
15 If  A P  was the price 
when the customer last evaluated/acted with rational attention, then the demand curve in future periods 
will be less elastic within the range where the costs of processing the price change information outweigh 
its benefits. Thus, between 
l
A P  and 
u
A P , the buyer will be rationally inattentive. If the price moves 
outside of this “region of inaction,” however, then she will process the new price information, triggering 
her response to the price change by adjusting her purchase along the original demand curve.
16 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 This conclusion likely holds for any explanation that relies on institutional features and arrangements. 
14 Tobin (Nobel Lecture, 1982, p. 189) makes a similar statement: “Some decisions by economic agents are reconsidered daily or hourly, 
while others are reviewed at intervals of a year or longer except when extraordinary events compel revisions. It would be desirable in 
principle to allow for differences among variables in frequencies of change and even to make these frequencies endogenous” (our emphasis). 
Frank and Jagannathan (1998, p. 188) suggest a similar mechanism to explain stock price behavior: "The idea is that for many investors it is 
not worth paying attention to small dividends, while at sufficiently high dividend levels almost all investors pay attention." 
15 The region of inattention does not have to be vertical; it only needs to be less elastic. See the Appendix for two alternative formulations. 
16 The demand curve we obtain under rational inattention differs from the standard “kinked” demand curve (Andersen, 1994). There the 
idea is that price decreases are instantaneously matched by competitors, but price increases are not. This makes customers less sensitive to 
price cuts and more sensitive to price increases. The reduced sensitivity to price cuts and increased sensitivity to price increases make both 
less valuable for the firm. As a result, firms have less incentive to change prices in either direction. In contrast to this, the inelastic region 
on the demand curve that is caused by customers’ rational inattention is symmetric around the current price, and thus leads to a reduction in 
the sensitivity to price changes symmetrically in both directions. Our model differs also from the model where customers are less price-
sensitive in the SR than in the LR (Okun, 1981). In Okun's model, buyers are unaware of the prices of all retailers in the SR because it 
takes time for customers to update their price information. In the LR, however, customers can shop around and update their price 





5.2.  Retailer’s Reaction to Consumers' Rational Inattention 
Now, consider a price-setter who recognizes that his customers are "rationally inattentive," and 
thus sees a region on the demand curve around the current price, where his customers’ price sensitivity is 
low for both small price increases and small price decreases. The consumers' reduced price sensitivity to 
small price decreases makes small price decreases less valuable to the seller because the lower price 
does not trigger the consumer's response: she does not buy more. However, a small price increase will be 
very valuable to the price setter for the same reason: his consumer will not reduce her quantity 
purchased.  
The reduced price sensitivity in both directions gives the retailer incentive to price at the upper 
bound of the inelastic range, e.g., 
u
A P  in Figure 4. Pricing lower than 
u
A P will reduce margins without 
gaining enough sales volume to make up for the lower margin, whereas pricing above 
u
A P  will trigger 
adjustment by customers. The latter imposes a natural limit on the ability of retailers to take advantage 
of rational inattention. A large price change, therefore, will trigger an adjustment of consumer purchase 
behavior along the original demand curve. Thus, the asymmetry will not hold for large price changes. 
Given the firm’s reaction to its customers’ inattention to small price changes, rational consumers 
know that retailers have incentive to make more small price increases than decreases. Therefore, both 
firms and consumers will expect asymmetric price adjustment in the small. Thus, asymmetric price 
adjustment in the small can be a rational expectations equilibrium. Both consumers and the retailers know 
that if prices move outside the range of inattention, the consumer will react to the change. Therefore, 
symmetric price adjustment can emerge as an equilibrium for large price changes.
17  
 
5.3.  Impossibility of Indefinite Continuous Small Price Increases 
The idea of rational inattention imposes a natural limit on how much surplus a retailer can extract 
from the consumer by strategically taking advantage of the customer's information-processing costs. 
According to our assumption, when information-processing is costly, the customer keeps buying the same 
old quantity of A (or the same old ratio of A and B, as discussed in the Appendix) when the price change 
for A is small. Thus, the customer relies on the price for which she has last optimized her purchase 
behavior (i.e., PA
*) to determine her quantity demanded. With the demand curve as depicted in Figure 4, 
that means the retailer can only raise its price to 
u
A P . Any additional price increase beyond that will push 
the price far enough from the last optimization price to trigger a re-optimization and consequently a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
them. The difference is that we focus on the size of price changes, while Okun focuses on the duration of the delay in the buyers’ reaction 
to the price change. Thus, whereas Okun suggests that customers will not react to SR price changes as fully as to LR price changes, we 




reduction in her purchase. Thus, under the assumption that the consumer bases her purchase behavior on 
the price for which she has last optimized, indefinite continuous small price increases are not feasible. 
 
5.4.  Small Price Decreases Are Still Possible 
Our theory does not require that all pricing decisions a retailer faces involve rationally inattentive 
customers. Considering the large number of pricing decisions faced by retailers—across product 
categories, individual products, across stores, and across seasons, holidays and non-holiday periods, 
etc.—this assumption would be too strong. From a customer perspective the costs of information 
processing may depend on, among other things, consumer’s opportunity cost of time, the ease with which 
she can carry out such calculations, her experience with doing this type of calculations which may be a 
function of the competitive environment the retailer faces, and the amount of the calculations required. 
Pricing decisions, therefore, could vary over the seasons (e.g., holiday vs. non-holiday), over 
competitive actions and reactions, etc. with different levels of customer attentiveness. Now, let the 
probability that the retailer faces a pricing decision best characterized by rationally inattentive and 
attentive customers be α  and (1 − α), respectively, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Then, as long as α is large enough, we 
will observe prices adjusting asymmetrically in the small. In other words, the retailer will still be 
making small price decreases, but he will be making more frequent small price increases than 
decreases.
18 
Our theory thus offers a possible explanation for the presence of small price changes, which has 
been a long standing puzzle in this literature. For example, Carlton (p. 121, 1986) finds “…a significant 
number of price changes that one would consider small (less than 1%).” Lach and Tsiddon (2005) also 
find small price changes in the Israeli grocery store data.
19 In Kashyap's (1995) data, 2.7 percent of the 
price changes are less than 1% in size, 7.2 percent—are of 1–2 percent in size, and 21 percent—are less 
than 3 percent in size. Our theory offers a possible explanation of these puzzling facts: when the costs 
of making small changes (menu costs) are offset by the possible gains accrued from an inelastic demand 
curve, firms may find it optimal to engage in small price changes, especially in small price increases. 
 
6.   Variation in Rational Inattention over the Business Cycle 
Rational inattention implies that there might be a variation in the price adjustment asymmetry 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
17 The idea of rational inattention builds on a customer-based argument, and therefore, assuming that competitors are selling to similar types 
of customers, they will also have the ability as well as the incentive to adjust their prices in an asymmetric manner. It is unlikely, therefore, 
that competitive reactions would necessarily undermine asymmetric pricing "in the small" by retailers. 
18 In the appendix we offer two examples of a simple optimization model with rational inattention, which generate asymmetric price 
adjustment "in the small." 
19 They argue that the menu cost model extended to a multi-product setting (Sheshinski and Weiss, 1997) will be consistent with small price 
changes, as long as the average price change of different products is not small. Gordon (1990) suggests that small price changes may be 
observed under menu costs if the price changes are necessitated by a permanent change in market conditions. Consistent with this prediction, 




over the business cycle.
 20 In situations where consumers have more time and greater opportunity to be 
attentive, we would expect to see reduced asymmetry. Similarly, in situations where consumers are 
pressed for time and have limited opportunity to be attentive, we would expect to see greater asymmetry. 
The business cycle might offer an opportunity—a kind of natural experiment—to observe such a 
variation in asymmetry because of the variation in unemployment over the cycle. During periods of high 
unemployment people have more time available to be attentive. At the same time, the value of being 
attentive to small price changes increases during periods of high unemployment. Thus, higher 
unemployment would coincide with greater attention and therefore, with lower asymmetry. During 
periods of low unemployment people have less time available to be attentive, while at the same time, the 
value of being attentive to small price changes diminishes. Lower unemployment would, therefore, 
coincide with less attention and greater asymmetry. For example, during periods of high unemployment 
people may react to single digit price changes, but during low unemployment periods, they might react 
only to double digit price changes or greater. This implies that we will expect to see smaller asymmetry 
thresholds during periods of high unemployment in comparison to low unemployment periods. 
Our 8-year sample period, from September 1989 to May 1997, contains an 8-month recession 
period from August 1990 to March 1991 as defined by the NBER, and we try to exploit it for comparing 
the extent of asymmetry during the recession and expansion periods. However, because unemployment 
lags output over the business cycle by about two quarters, the highest and the lowest unemployment 
periods do not coincide exactly with recession and expansion, respectively. We therefore conduct two 
analyses. In the first, we compare the asymmetry thresholds obtained using the data pertaining to the 
NBER recession months with the asymmetry thresholds obtained using the data pertaining to the lowest 
unemployment months. In the second, we compare the asymmetry thresholds obtained using the data 
pertaining to the highest unemployment months with the asymmetry thresholds obtained using the data 
pertaining to the lowest unemployment months. In each case we repeat the analysis twice: in one we use 
the US unemployment rate, and in the second the Chicago-unemployment rate. These two series are 
included in Table 3. Because the recession observed in our sample lasted 8-month period, all asymmetry 
thresholds reported in this section are based on the analysis of the data over 8-month windows. 
The findings are reported in Table 9. On the LHS of the table we report the asymmetry thresholds 
while on the RHS we report the corresponding sample size. As Table 3 indicates, the period of lowest 
unemployment rates for the US coincides with that of Chicago, and occurs during September 1996–April 
1997, with the average unemployment rates of 4.8 percent and 5.2 percent, respectively. The highest 
unemployment rate period according to the u-US series is from February 1992 to September 1992 
                                                           
20 Another interesting implication of rational inattention is the optimality of price points, such as 9¢, 99¢, $1.29, etc. See Chen, et al. (2004). 




averaging 7.6%, while according to the u-Chicago series it is from December 1991 to July 1992, 
averaging 8.1 percent. In Table 9, the Low column indicates the asymmetry thresholds obtained using 
the data pertaining to the lowest unemployment 8-month period. There is only one such column because, 
as mentioned above, the periods in which the US and the Chicago unemployment rates attain their 
lowest average value over an 8-month period, coincide with each other. The column NBER indicates the 
asymmetry thresholds obtained using the data pertaining to the 8-month period of the NBER recession, 
during which the average unemployment rate was 6.3 percent. Finally, the High-Chicago and the High-
US columns indicate the asymmetry thresholds obtained using the data pertaining to the highest 
unemployment 8-month periods based on Chicago- and US-unemployment rates, respectively. 
According to the results in Table 9, the asymmetry threshold is larger for the lowest 
unemployment periods than for the other periods. Across the 27 product categories, in 60 cases out of 75 
possible comparisons, i.e., in 80 percent of the cases, we find a stronger asymmetry for the lowest 
unemployment period, in 5 cases, i.e., in 6.7 percent of the cases, we find equal asymmetry, and in 10 
cases, i.e., in 13.3 percent of the cases, we find weaker asymmetry for the lowest unemployment period 
than for the other periods.
21 Further, these figures imply that for the low unemployment period sample, 
the average asymmetry threshold is 9.6 cent, for the NBER recession sample it is 0.6 cent, for the high-
Chicago sample the threshold is 4 cent, and for the high-US sample, the threshold occurs at 3.4 cent.  
Thus, we find that the asymmetry is stronger when unemployment is low, as predicted by the 
theory of rational inattention. This holds true regardless of the criterion used for identifying the high 
unemployment period (the NBER months or the highest unemployment months).
22 The finding that the 
asymmetry threshold obtained for the NBER recession period is lower than those obtained for either of 
the two high unemployment periods, suggests that unemployment rate, being a single-variable indicator 
of the economic activity, perhaps is not a good measure of the overall economic conditions, in 
                                                           
21 The theoretical prediction of rational inattention is statistically supported: 77.6% > 50%, z = 6.81, with p < .0001. Paired t-test confirms 
this conclusion: for the 27 product categories, the asymmetry is larger for the lowest unemployment period than for the other three periods 
(p < .01 or better). This difference is unlikely to be driven by differences in sample size; even though the lowest unemployment period has a 
large sample size than the other three periods, the differences are not statistically significant (p > .05 or worse). Also, if we focus on product 
categories where the sample size is smaller for the lowest unemployment period, the difference in asymmetry threshold is still in the right 
direction, and most of the time statistically significant (p < .05 in 13 out of 18 comparisons). In the remaining five cases, the difference is in 
the predicted direction but not statistically significant, largely because of the small sample size (5 to 10 for t-tests). 
22 Could the results we report in this section be an artifact of the negative relationship between inflation and unemployment? In that case, 
the finding that the asymmetry threshold is smaller during the 8 months that had the highest unemployment rate could simply mean that 
there was a deflation during that specific period. To check if that is the case, we calculated the inflation rates for each of the three 8-month 
periods, using the PPI, CPI- and CPI-Chicago price indexes. When we compare the 8 months that had the highest unemployment rate with 
the 8 months that had the lowest unemployment rate, the inflation rate is higher for the former, regardless of which price index is used. We 
see the same pattern when we compare the 8 months that had the lowest unemployment rate with the NBER's 8 month long recession 
period. The unemployment rate is higher during recession, but the inflation rate is also higher (again, regardless of which index we use). 
Thus, we conclude that the findings are not related to the inflation-unemployment relationship. Another explanation might be that during 
high unemployment periods there are more price decreases, perhaps because retailers use price promotions more frequently to boost sales 
during economic downturns. As pointed out earlier, however, price promotions are generally temporary and therefore reversed in the 
subsequent period, in which case they should not lead to any change in the asymmetry. To the extent that some of the price promotions are 
not reversed, however, that could reduce the extent of asymmetry we see in the data. This rival explanation is not inconsistent with our 




comparison to the NBER composite index on which the identification of the NBER recession is based. 
 
7. Conclusion  and  Caveats 
In this paper we find overwhelming evidence of asymmetry “in the small,” for price changes of 
up to about 10 cents, on average. The asymmetry disappears for larger price changes. The findings, 
which hold in low inflation and in deflation periods, are robust to variety of tests. As far as we know, 
this type of asymmetry has not been reported in the literature before, and is small enough to fly under the 
radar screen, which suggests that asymmetric price adjustment may be more prevalent than we think.  
To explain our findings, we offer a model in which price-setters act strategically by taking 
advantage of the fact that their consumers face information processing costs, and making asymmetric 
price adjustments “in the small.”
23 Our paper also offers a possible resolution of a long-standing puzzle: 
the presence of small price changes in many transaction price data. Further, our model predicts that the 
extent of the asymmetry observed “in the small” should vary over the business cycle: it should diminish 
during recessions and strengthen during expansions. Our data appear consistent with these predictions. 
We are aware of at least two studies, which reports findings of asymmetric price adjustment "in 
the small" in another data. Baudry, et al. (2004) study the distribution of price changes using French 
micro data for the 1994–2003 period. Their Figure 9 (p. 55) clearly indicates an asymmetric price 
adjustment "in the small" (although the authors fail to "notice" it…). A similar form of asymmetry is 
found also in Spanish data for the 1993–2001 period (Álvarez and Hernando, 2004). Indeed, according 
to Cecchetti (2004), the phenomenon of asymmetric price adjustment in the small is quite widespread in 
Europe and is not limited to just food store prices. This suggests that the phenomenon we document 
might be more widespread and not limited to grocery chains or to the U.S. 
However, it is still unclear how generalizable our findings are to other types of goods or markets. 
In the specific setting we study, the retailer faces buyers with little at stake in the price of an individual 
item. It is likely, therefore, that asymmetric price adjustment in the small will be present in other settings 
where low-priced, commonly consumed retail goods are sold. For example, customers of retail 
establishments like Target, Sears, Wal-Mart, as well as the customers of large chain drugstores, who 
purchase perishables and small consumer packaged goods, are likely to behave in a similar way. We 
speculate, therefore, that such settings, we will likely see asymmetric price adjustment in the small. 
There are markets, however, where attention is critical. For example, in financial and business-to-
business markets and in where a typical transaction involves a large quantity of the same asset, buyers 
will certainly be more attentive. In fact, in these markets, there are people whose only job is to pay 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           




attention to individual pennies or even less. In such settings, it is unlikely to see asymmetry in the small. 
It is less clear whether rational inattention will be optimal in other settings. For example, in 
markets for big-ticket items people are likely to be more attentive because these transactions involve 
large expenditures (Bell, et al., 1998; Nagle and Holden, 2002). However, when considering big-ticket 
items, shoppers might ignore some rightmost digits. For example, car shoppers may choose to be 
inattentive to the rightmost digits, and thus focus on fourteen thousand eight hundred dollars when the 
actual price is $14,889.00. This would create some room for asymmetric price adjustment in the small. 
It will be valuable, therefore, to study other data sets, products, and markets. In this regard, 
exploring internet prices might be particularly useful because on the internet, information gathering costs 
appear lower. Search engines enable instantaneous price comparisons at many sites simultaneously, 
reducing the cost of information gathering and processing (Lee, et al., 2003). We suspect, therefore, that 
internet prices will exhibit less asymmetry.
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
23 In support of the idea of rational inattention and its relevance for retail settings, we shall note the fact that many retailers such as large US 
supermarket chains find it necessary to alert the public about their promotions by posting sales' signs on shelves or at end-of-the-isles. Such 
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Appendix: Two Models of Rational Inattention 
 
In this appendix, we formalize the idea of rational inattention by offering two examples of a 
simple optimization model with rational inattention, which generate asymmetry in small price 
adjustments. We begin by considering two possible pricing situations a retailer could face. First we 
explore a standard economic setting where the retailer faces customers that are rationally attentive, i.e. 
they have a negligible information-processing cost. Then we explore a setting with rational inattention, 
where the retailer faces customers that have a sizeable information-processing cost.  
For each situation we first solve the problem of consumer’s optimal purchase behavior. We then 
obtain solutions for the retailer’s optimal pricing strategy. When the information-processing cost is zero, 
the solution we obtain is a standard one. However, when the information processing cost is greater than 
zero, then consumers find it beneficial to be rationally inattentive to small price changes, while knowing 
that the firm will find it optimal to adjust prices asymmetrically. The firm’s ability to adjust prices 
asymmetrically in those situations, however, is limited to the customer’s region of rational 
inattentiveness.   
Consider a market with two products, A and B. Assume a utility function U (A, B) = v ln A + ln B, 
where v denotes the degree of substitutability between the two products. The customer calculates her 
optimal purchase behavior for products A and B, taking as given prices PA and PB. Further assume that 
the customer spends all her income, has no savings, and consumes all the products bought that period. 
Also, let the probability that the retailer faces a pricing decision best characterized by rationally 
inattentive and attentive customers be α  and (1 − α), respectively, with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. We focus on the seller 
of product A, who maximizes profits facing costs C =  b A / a + 2 ,  ) 0 , 0 ( > > b a , and with full 
information about the customer’s demand function. We first derive the optimality conditions under 
rational attention, i.e., when consumer information-processing cost is zero. 
 
i.  Optimal Purchase and Pricing Policy under Rational Attention 
The optimal purchase behavior and pricing behavior for any period is given as follows. 
Customer’s Purchase Policy: 
The customer solves the following optimization problem: 
Maximize:   U (A, B) = v ln A + ln B          ( A 1 )  
s.t.     PAA+PBB = M            ( A 2 )  
where M is the customer’s single period income. The optimal quantities of A and B, and the utility 
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This is a standard solution to consumer’s utility maximization problem, where consumer’s optimal 
consumption level of product A is completely flexible with respect to changes in the price of product A. 
That is, any change in PA will bring about a corresponding change in A*.  
 
Retailer’s Pricing Policy: 
A retailer who produces good A and faces the demand function given in equation (A3), solves the 
following optimization problem: 
Maximize:   A C PA ) ( − = π  
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A = *           ( A 8 )  
This is a standard solution to retailer’s profit maximization problem, where retailer’s optimal price for 
product A is completely flexible with respect to changes in its cost for product A. That is, any change in 
b, for example, will bring about a corresponding change in 
*
A P . Recall that the retailer faces this type of 
pricing situation α percent of the time. 
 
ii.  Optimal Purchase and Pricing Policy under Rational Inattention 
However, on other occasions, the retailer believes that it faces a different type of consumers. 
Specifically, (1 − α) percent of the time, the retailer believes that it faces consumers that have a sizeable 
information processing cost. To understand the consumer and retailer behaviors in such pricing 
situations, we need to consider a two-period game.  
In such a game, suppose that the price of A changes from PA in period 1 to PA’ in period 2, and 




1. However, she will incur information-processing cost, which we measure in terms of lost utility, x, if 
she decides to re-optimize by recalculating her optimal consumption level for the new price. Such a cost 
might be nontrivial given the wide range of prices that a retailer may offer in period 2. 
Nevertheless, for a given consumer, the cost of doing such calculations remains largely fixed.
24 In 
the meantime, the benefit of doing such calculations increases with the magnitude of the price change. 
Therefore, for a rather small price change, it may be optimal to keep the same purchase behavior and 
avoid paying the information-processing cost, x. We assume that the consumer decides before period 2 
unravels on whether to re-optimize by incurring the information-processing cost and adjust her 
consumption accordingly, or keep the earlier purchase behavior. 
 
Example 1: A Model with Customer Decision Rule Based on a Constant Quantity of A 
If the consumer decides to keep the earlier purchase behavior, she needs to use some rule to 
decide what and how much to purchase. We assume the consumer stays within her budget constraint and 
applies a heuristic rule to the purchase of good A. According to this rule, we assume, the customer buys 
the same amount of the good, and then gets the other good with whatever money is left under her budget 
constraint.
25 We demonstrate below that for a positive information-processing cost, there is a price range 
in which it is optimal for the consumer to be rigid in her purchase behavior. 
From equation (A5), we can easily infer that if the customer processes the price information and 
adjusts her consumption, the new utility, before incurring x, is: 
U* = (v+1) lnM – v ln 
v
v 1 + PA’ – ln (v+1) PB      (A9) 
Alternatively, if she keeps her consumption of A constant, the new demand functions can be 
calculated from: 
A* =  M
P v
v
A ) 1 ( +
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PA’A + PB B = M         ( A 1 0 )  
B =  M
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which yield 
U = v ln  M
P v
v
A ) 1 ( +
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We know that U* > U, since U* is the maximum utility; U = U* when PA’ = PA.  
Since the customer will recalculate only if U − U* > x, there exists a range of small price changes 
                                                           
24 The information-processing cost of a consumer may be changed by, for example, (un)employment, birth of a child, education, etc. At the 




within which the consumer will find it optimal not to recalculate. To see this, let PA’ = θ PA. Then: 
U − U* = − ln  ) 1 ( ( v v
v θ θ − + > 0       (A13) 
Let E =  ) 1 ( v v





∂ − v v
E v , which is negative when θ  > 1, equals 0 
when θ  = 1, and is positive when θ  < 1. Since natural log is a monotonically increasing function, (U* − 
U) is convex in θ and takes on its minimum value when θ  = 1 (i.e., PA’ = PA). We know from above that 
U* − U = 0 when θ = 1 (i.e., PA’ = PA). Therefore, there exists a region around θ  = 1, in which U* − U < 








A P P θ =  be the lower limit of this range (
u
A θ  
> 1, 
l
A θ  < 1).
26 In this region, the customer does not find it optimal to process the price change 
information; she just keeps buying A in the quantity given by equation (A3). This is the region of rational 
inattention. 
 
Customer’s Purchase Policy: 
A forward-looking customer who is aware of the existence of her information processing cost, 
knows that the retailer will act strategically to take advantage of the situation by increasing the price in 
the second period by a factor of  1 >
u
A θ . The consumer faces the following optimization problem: 
Maximize:   U (A, B) = v ln A + ln B  + β (v ln A + ln B)      (A14) 
s.t.     PAA+  A
u
AP θ A + 2PBB = 2M,        (A15) 
where β is the customer’s discount rate. Thus the customer maximizes her total utility over two periods, 
knowing that in the second period the price will be increased by a factor of 
u
A θ  and that she will not 
change her purchase behavior. The solution of the problem is given by 
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B* =  M
P v B ) 1 (
1
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         ( A 1 7 )  
A demand curve of this type is displayed graphically in Figure 4. 
 
Retailer’s Pricing Policy: 
Now, since the retailer is able to raise the price a little bit in the second period without triggering a 
change in the customer’s purchase behavior, and given the forward-looking customer’s demand function 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
25 Our results on asymmetric price adjustment in the small are robust to some alternative heuristic purchase rules (see Example 2 below) as 
long as the consumer stays within her budget constraint, or if she violates the budget constraint in one period but adjusts in later periods. 
26 When v = 1, a closed-form solution exists for this region. Specifically,  [ ] c c − + − − ∈ 1 1 , 1 1 θ , where c = e
−x. For example, when x = 




in equation (A16), the firm’s optimization problem is: 
Maximize:   A C PA ) ( − = π + τ A C PA
u
A ) ( − θ        (A18) 




2 ,        
a > 0, b > 0, A is given by equation (A16), and τ is the retailer’s discount rate. Thus, the retailer 
maximizes its total profit over two periods, knowing that it can increase the price in the second period by 
a factor of 
u
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Compared with the price in equation (A6), the price in equation (A19) is lower, and the price in equation 
(A20) is higher, for 
u
A θ >1. Substituting equation (A19) into equation (A16), we get 
b
a
A = * , which is 
exactly the same as the demand function in equation (A8).  
Therefore, when faced with a forward-looking customer who must incur an information-
processing cost x to re-calculate optimal consumption level, which occurs (1−α) percent of the time, the 
retailer will act strategically by setting a low initial price and raising it in the second period by a little bit. 
Because of the optimality of inattentiveness in the small, the customer will keep her consumption 












A P P θ = , as given in equation (A20).  
Thus, the main implication of the model is asymmetric price adjustment “in the small,” and 
symmetric price adjustment in the large. This example also demonstrates how the idea of rational 
inattention in the small imposes a natural limit on how much surplus a retailer can extract from the 
consumer by strategically taking advantage of the customer information-processing costs. Recall that 
according to our assumption, when there is a positive information-processing cost, the customer keeps 
buying the same old quantity of A (or the same old ratio, as modeled further below) when the price 
change for A is small. Thus, the customer relies on the price for which she last optimized her purchase 
behavior (i.e., PA
*) to determine her quantity demanded. With the demand curve as depicted in Figure 4, 
that means the retailer can only raise its price to 
u
A P . Any additional price increase will trigger the 
customer's re-optimization and consequently a reduction in her purchase. Therefore, under the assumption 




continuous small price increases are not feasible.
27 
We shall emphasize that this result does not require that all pricing decisions the retailer faces 
involve rationally inattentive customers. As long as α is large enough, prices will adjust asymmetrically 
in the small. In other words, the retailer will still be making small price decreases but it will make more 
small price increases than decreases. 
 
Example 2: A Model with Customer Decision Rule Based on a Constant Ratio of A and B 
We now present another version of the model presented above by constructing an example in 
which the region of rational inattention along the demand curve is not necessarily vertical. In this version 
we assume the same structure as in the example above except that for the α percent of the situations 
where consumers face a sizeable information processing cost, the consumer's decision rule, if she doesn’t 
re-optimize, is to buy the same ratio of the quantities of products A and B, until her budget constraint is 
violated. Thus, the only difference between this model and the model studied above is in the type of 
heuristic rule the consumer adopts. 
Before period 2 unravels, the consumer has to make a choice between two options. She can decide 
to re-optimize to maximize her utility under the new price, and incur the information processing cost of x. 
Or she can decide to keep buying the same ratio of the quantities of A and B as in period 1: A*/B* = 
vPB/PA. Which option she will choose depends on the magnitude of her information processing cost. 
As before, suppose the price of A changes from PA to PA’, and the price of B does not change. 
Recall that if she re-optimizes, the new utility, before incurring the information processing cost x, is: 
U* = (v+1) lnM – v ln 
v
v 1 +
PA’ – ln (v+1) PB     ( A 9 )  
If she keeps the old ratio, the new demands can be determined by solving from 
PA’A + PB B = M,   a n d          ( A 1 0 )  
A = Bv (PB / PA)         ( A 2 1 )  
where (A21) is derived from equations (A3) and (A4). These yield: 
A =  M
P vP
v
A A ) ' ( +
         ( A 2 2 )  
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She will re-optimize only if U* − U > x. We know that U* > U, since U* is the maximum utility; U = U* 
                                                           
27 The model implies that ceteris paribus, retailers will adjust asymmetrically once and keep the price there. However, note that retailers 




when PA’ =  PA.  
Since the customer will re-optimize only if U − U* > x, there will exist a range of a small price 
change within which the consumer will not recalculate her demands. To see this, let PA’ = θ PA. Then: 
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E
, which is 
negative when θ  > 1, equals 0 when θ  = 1, and is positive when θ  < 1. Since natural log is a 
monotonically increasing function, (U* − U) is convex in θ, and takes on its minimum value when θ  = 1 
(i.e., PA’ =  PA). And we know from above that U* − U = 0 when θ = 1 (i.e., PA’ =  PA). Therefore, there 









A P P θ =  be the lower limit of this range (
u
A θ  > 1, 
l
A θ  < 1). In this region, it will be optimal for the 
customer not to incur the information processing cost; she should keep buying A and B at the ratio as 
given in equation (A21). When v = 1, a closed-form solution exists for this region. Specifically, we'll have 
] 2 1 2 , 2 1 2 [
2 2 c c c c c c − + − − − − ∈ θ , where c = exp(x). For example, if PA = $1.00, and x = 0.01, 
then c = 1.01, and θ is between 0.82 and 1.22. That is, a price change in the range of [−18¢, 22¢] will go 
unnoticed. Compared with the demand curve in Figure 4, when the consumer uses the last period’s ratio 
as her decision rule, we obtain a demand curve with a kink that is not completely vertical, but simply less 
elastic, as shown in Figure A1. The rest of the model derivation is the same as above. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
with consumers re-processing the information beginning with this new price. Thus, periods of unchanged prices are not predicted when the 
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*Table 1. Product Categories and the Number of Weekly Price Observations 
 
Product Category  Number of Weekly Observations  Proportion of the Total 
Analgesics 3,059,922  0.0310 
Bath Soap  418,097  0.0042 
Bathroom Tissue  1,156,481  0.0117 
Beer 1,970,266  0.0200 
Bottled Juice  4,324,595  0.0438 
Canned Soup  5,549,149  0.0562 
Canned Tuna  2,403,151  0.0244 
Cereals 4,747,889  0.0481 
Cheeses 7,571,355  0.0767 
Cigarettes 1,810,614  0.0183 
Cookies 7,634,434  0.0774 
Crackers 2,245,305  0.0228 
Dish Detergent  2,183,013  0.0221 
Fabric Softeners  2,295,534  0.0233 
Front-End-Candies 3,952,470  0.0400 
Frozen Dinners  1,654,051  0.0168 
Frozen Entrees  7,231,871  0.0733 
Frozen Juices  2,373,168  0.0240 
Grooming Products  4,065,691  0.0412 
Laundry Detergents  3,302,753  0.0335 
Oatmeal 981,106  0.0099 
Paper Towels  948,550  0.0096 
Refrigerated Juices  2,176,518  0.0221 
Shampoos 4,676,731  0.0474 
Snack Crackers  3,509,158  0.0356 
Soaps 1,834,040  0.0186 
Soft Drinks  10,547,266  0.1069 
Toothbrushes 1,852,487  0.0188 
Toothpastes 2,997,748  0.0304 
Total 98,691,750  1.0000 
    
Table 2. Asymmetry Thresholds in Cents Based on the PPI-Measure of Price Level 
  
  Entire Sample Period  Low Inflation Period  Deflation Period 
Analgesics 30  10  10 
Bath Soap  6  0  0 
Bathroom Tissues  6  4  4 
Bottled Juices  12  15  12 
Canned Soup   12  12  10 
Canned Tuna   1  2  1 
Cereals 29  24  1 
Cheeses   9  9  9 
Cookies   11  11  9 
Crackers   10  2  4 
Dish Detergent   5  4  6 
Fabric Softeners   5  11  7 
Front-end-candies   5  5  5 
Frozen Dinners   2  10  6 
Frozen Entrees   20  22  0 
Frozen Juices   9  9  10 
Grooming Products   20  12  12 
Laundry Detergents   16  13  17 
Oatmeal 25  2  5 
Paper Towels   2  2  2 
Refrigerated Juices  15  9  6 
Shampoos 0  10  10 
Snack Crackers   11  2  2 
Soaps 1  1  1 
Soft Drinks   5  3  5 
Tooth Brushes   20  3  3 
Tooth Pastes  18  14  6 
Average 11.3  8.2  6.2 
Median 10  9  6 
 
Notes: 
PPI = Producer Price Index. 
The figures reported in the table are the cutoff points of what might constitute a “small” price change for each 
category. The cutoff point is the first point at which the asymmetry is not supported statistically. Thus, for example, 
in the Analgesics category, when the entire sample is used, we see that for price changes of up to 30 cents, there is 
asymmetry. 
      
Table 3. Three Measures of Inflation (PPI, CPI, and CPI-Chicago) and Two Measures of Unemployment (u) 
(u-US and u-Chicago), September 1989–May 1997 
 
Year Month  PPI  %ΔPPI  CPI  %ΔCPI  CPI-Chicago %ΔCPI-Chicago  u-US u-Chicago
1989  September  113.6       -  125.0        -  127.1           -  5.3  - 
1989 October  114.9  1.14 125.6 0.5  126.8  −0.2  5.3 - 
1989 November  114.9  0.00 125.9 0.2  126.7  −0.1  5.4 - 
1989 December  115.4  0.44 126.1 0.2  126.5  −0.2  5.4 - 
1990 January  117.6  1.91 127.4  1.0  128.1  1.3  5.4  6.1 
1990 February  117.4  −0.17 128.0  0.5  129.2  0.9  5.3 6.0 
1990 March  117.2  −0.17 128.7  0.5  129.5  0.2  5.2 6.0 
1990 April  117.2  0.00 128.9  0.2  130.4  0.7  5.4  5.9 
1990 May  117.7  0.43 129.2  0.2  130.4  0.0  5.4  5.8 
1990 June  117.8  0.08 129.9  0.5  131.7  1.0  5.2  6.3 
1990 July  118.2  0.34 130.4  0.4  132.0  0.2  5.5  6.1 
1990 August  119.3  0.93 131.6  0.9  133.2  0.9  5.7  6.2 
1990 September  120.4  0.92 132.7  0.8  133.8  0.5  5.9  6.1 
1990 October  122.3  1.58 133.5 0.6  133.3  −0.4  5.9 5.9 
1990 November  122.9  0.49 133.8  0.2  134.2  0.7  6.2  6.0 
1990 December  122.0  −0.73 133.8  0.0  134.6  0.3  6.3 6.1 
1991 January  122.3  0.25 134.6  0.6  135.1  0.4  6.4  6.7 
1991 February  121.4  −0.74 134.8  0.1  135.5  0.3  6.6 6.7 
1991 March  120.9  −0.41 135.0  0.1  136.2  0.5  6.8 6.9 
1991 April  121.1  0.17 135.2 0.1  136.1  −0.1  6.7 6.8 
1991 May  121.8  0.58 135.6  0.3  136.8  0.5  6.9  6.6 
1991 June  121.9  0.08 136.0  0.3  137.3  0.4  6.9  7.2 
1991 July  121.6  −0.25 136.2  0.1  137.3  0.0  6.8 6.9 
1991 August  121.7  0.08 136.6  0.3  137.6  0.2  6.9  7.0 
1991 September  121.4  −0.25 137.2  0.4  138.3  0.5  6.9 7.0 
1991 October  122.2  0.66 137.4 0.1  138.0  −0.2  7.0 7.2 
1991 November  122.3  0.08 137.8  0.3  138.0  0.0  7.0  7.5 
1991 December  121.9  −0.33 137.9  0.1  138.3  0.2  7.3 7.9 
1992 January  121.8  −0.08 138.1  0.1  138.9  0.4  7.3 8.4 
1992 February  122.1  0.25 138.6  0.4  139.2  0.2  7.4  8.4 
1992 March  122.2  0.08 139.3  0.5  139.7  0.4  7.4  8.3 
1992 April  122.4  0.16 139.5  0.1  139.8  0.1  7.4  8.0 
1992 May  123.2  0.65 139.7  0.1  140.5  0.5  7.6  7.9 
1992 June  123.9  0.57 140.2  0.4  141.2  0.5  7.8  8.3 
1992 July  123.7  −0.16 140.5  0.2  141.4  0.1  7.7 7.8 
1992 August  123.6  −0.08 140.9  0.3  141.9  0.4  7.6 6.4 
1992 September  123.3  −0.24 141.3  0.3  142.7  0.6  7.6 6.2 
1992 October  124.4  0.89 141.8 0.4  142.1  −0.4  7.3 6.1 
1992 November  124.0  −0.32 142.0  0.1  142.4  0.2  7.4 6.4 
1992 December  123.8  −0.16 141.9  −0.1 142.9  0.4  7.4 6.8 
1993 January  124.2  0.32 142.6  0.5  143.2  0.2  7.3  7.6 
1993 February  124.5  0.24 143.1  0.4  143.6  0.3  7.1  7.8 
1993 March  124.7  0.16 143.6  0.3  144.1  0.3  7.0  7.9 
1993 April  125.5  0.64 144.0  0.3  144.7  0.4  7.1  7.7 
1993 May  125.8  0.24 144.2  0.1  145.7  0.7  7.1  7.5 
1993 June  125.5  −0.24 144.4  0.1  145.6  −0.1  7.0 7.9 
1993 July  125.3  −0.16 144.4  0.0  145.5  −0.1  6.9 7.5 
1993 August  124.2  −0.88 144.8  0.3  146.1  0.4  6.8 7.5 
1993 September  123.8  −0.32 145.1  0.2  146.7  0.4  6.7 7.7 
      
1993 October  124.6  0.65 145.7  0.4  147.2  0.3  6.8  7.3 
1993 November  124.5  −0.08 145.8  0.1  146.4  −0.5  6.6 5.8 
1993 December  124.1  −0.32 145.8  0.0  146.1  −0.2  6.5 5.9 
1994 January  124.5  0.32 146.2  0.3  146.5  0.3  6.6  6.7 
1994 February  124.8  0.24 146.7  0.3  146.8  0.2  6.6  6.6 
1994 March  124.9  0.08 147.2  0.3  147.6  0.5  6.5  6.3 
1994 April  125.0  0.08 147.4  0.1  147.9  0.2  6.4  5.7 
1994 May  125.3  0.24 147.5 0.1  147.6  −0.2  6.1 5.5 
1994 June  125.6  0.24 148.0  0.3  148.1  0.3  6.1  5.8 
1994 July  126.0  0.32 148.4  0.3  148.3  0.1  6.1  5.5 
1994 August  126.5  0.40 149.0  0.4  149.8  1.0  6.0  5.4 
1994 September  125.6  −0.71 149.4  0.3  150.2  0.3  5.9 5.2 
1994 October  125.8  0.16 149.5 0.1  149.4  −0.5  5.8 5.1 
1994 November  126.1  0.24 149.7  0.1  150.4  0.7  5.6  4.8 
1994 December  126.2  0.08 149.7  0.0  150.5  0.1  5.5  4.9 
1995 January  126.6  0.32 150.3  0.4  151.8  0.9  5.6  5.5 
1995 February  126.9  0.24 150.9  0.4  152.3  0.3  5.4  5.5 
1995 March  127.1  0.16 151.4  0.3  152.6  0.2  5.4  5.2 
1995 April  127.6  0.39 151.9  0.3  153.1  0.3  5.8  5.2 
1995 May  128.1  0.39 152.2 0.2  153.0  −0.1  5.6 5.0 
1995 June  128.2  0.08 152.5  0.2  153.5  0.3  5.6  5.1 
1995 July  128.2  0.00 152.5  0.0  153.6  0.1  5.7  5.0 
1995 August  128.1  −0.08 152.9  0.3  153.8  0.1  5.7 5.1 
1995 September  127.9  −0.16 153.2  0.2  154.0  0.1  5.6 4.8 
1995 October  128.7  0.63 153.7  0.3  154.3  0.2  5.5  4.7 
1995 November  128.7  0.00 153.6  −0.1 154.0  −0.2  5.6 4.7 
1995 December  129.1  0.31 153.5  −0.1 153.8  −0.1  5.6 5.0 
1996 January  129.4  0.23 154.4  0.6  154.6  0.5  5.6  5.6 
1996 February  129.4  0.00 154.9  0.3  155.2  0.4  5.5  5.5 
1996 March  130.1  0.54 155.7  0.5  156.3  0.7  5.5  5.4 
1996 April  130.6  0.38 156.3  0.4  156.4  0.1  5.6  5.1 
1996 May  131.1  0.38 156.6  0.2  156.9  0.3  5.6  4.9 
1996 June  131.7  0.46 156.7  0.1  157.6  0.4  5.3  5.3 
1996 July  131.5  −0.15 157.0  0.2  157.7  0.1  5.5 5.1 
1996 August  131.9  0.30 157.3  0.2  158.1  0.3  5.1  5.0 
1996 September  131.8  −0.08 157.8  0.3  158.3  0.1  5.2 4.8 
1996 October  132.7  0.68 158.3  0.3  158.8  0.3  5.2  4.5 
1996 November  132.6  −0.08 158.6  0.2  159.4  0.4  5.4 4.5 
1996 December  132.7  0.08 158.6  0.0  159.7  0.2  5.4  4.7 
1997 January  132.6  −0.08 159.1  0.3  160.4  0.4  5.3 5.2 
1997 February  132.2  −0.30 159.6  0.3  161.1  0.4  5.2 5.1 
1997 March  132.1  −0.08 160.0  0.3  161.0  −0.1  5.2 4.9 
1997 April  131.6  −0.38 160.2  0.1  160.9  −0.1  5.1 4.5 
1997 May  131.6  0.00 160.1  −0.1 161.1  0.1  4.9 4.2 
 
      
Table 4. Asymmetry Thresholds in Cents for the PPI-Deflationary Period with Lagged Price Adjustment 
 
  4-Week Lag  8-Week Lag  12-Week Lag  16-Week Lag 
Analgesics 12 5 10 1 
Bath Soap  0  0  0  0 
Bathroom Tissues  4  4  4  3 
Bottled Juices  10  2  6  7 
Canned Soup   11  10  12  11 
Canned Tuna   2  2  1  6 
Cereals 25  0  25  11 
Cheeses   9  2  9  8 
Cookies   11  10  11  4 
Crackers   4  2  4  3 
Dish Detergent   10  2  6  6 
Fabric Softeners   13  2  1  1 
Front-end-candies   4  6  2  0 
Frozen Dinners   9  9  2  8 
Frozen Entrees   4  20  10  5 
Frozen Juices   9  1  6  1 
Grooming Products   18  18  10  4 
Laundry Detergents   13  11  5  2 
Oatmeal 4  4  12  1 
Paper Towels   2  2  2  2 
Refrigerated Juices  6  18  11  5 
Shampoos 5  5 0  0 
Snack Crackers   2  2  2  1 
Soaps 2  1  1  1 
Soft Drinks   2  9  2  0 
Tooth Brushes   1  10  8  3 
Tooth Pastes  6  7  20  7 
Average 7.3  6.1  6.7  3.7 
Median 6  4  6  3 
      
Table 5. Asymmetry Thresholds in Cents, Deflation Periods, 
Based on CPI-Chicago and CPI 
 
 
 CPI-Chicago  CPI 
Analgesics  7 10 
Bath Soap  0 0 
Bathroom Tissues  4 9 
Bottled Juices  8 9 
Canned Soup   14 10 
Canned Tuna   1 1 
Cereals  33 28 
Cheeses   5 8 
Cookies   4 11 
Crackers   1 1 
Dish Detergent   9 7 
Fabric Softeners   8 3 
Front-end-candies   7 9 
Frozen Dinners   1 1 
Frozen Entrees   11 10 
Frozen Juices   5 7 
Grooming Products   23 13 
Laundry Detergents   20 9 
Oatmeal  4 2 
Paper Towels   2 2 
Refrigerated Juices  9 6 
Shampoos  5 0 
Snack Crackers   6 3 
Soaps  6 2 
Soft Drinks   2 1 
Tooth Brushes   1 8 
Tooth Pastes  6 6 
Average  7.5 6.5 
Median  6 7 
 
      
Table 6. Asymmetry Thresholds in Cents Based on CPI-Chicago and CPI with Lagged Price Adjustment 
 
  4-Week Lag  8-Week Lag  12-Week Lag  16-Week Lag 
  CPI-Chicago CPI CPI-Chicago CPI CPI-Chicago CPI CPI-Chicago CPI 
Analgesics  0 1  0 0 5 0  14 0 
Bath  Soap  0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bathroom  Tissues  4 5  4 4 4 4 3 6 
Bottled  Juices  10 2  16 2 0 0 2 3 
Canned  Soup    12  11  13 0  11 2  12 8 
Canned  Tuna    1 1  2 2 1 1 1 1 
Cereals  29  0  29 21  0 25 29 28 
Cheeses    9  12  10 2 6 1 2  10 
Cookies    11 3  11 5  12 5  10  10 
Crackers    1 7  3 4 6  10 2 6 
Dish  Detergent    5 1  2 4 1 1 2 3 
Fabric  Softeners    2 5  1 0 1 1 1 2 
Front-end-candies    6 9  5 6 2 6 1 1 
Frozen  Dinners    2 2  3 1 1 2 1 1 
Frozen  Entrees    3  10  0  12 0 0 4 9 
Frozen  Juices    1 1  9 1  14 5 2 4 
Grooming  Products    5 13  12  8 18 14  6  1 
Laundry  Detergents    3 0  1 3 1  12 3  13 
Oatmeal  5 2  1 4 3 4 4  17 
Paper  Towels    1 2  2 2 2 2 1 2 
Refrigerated  Juices  3 6  3 2 6 9 9 5 
Shampoos  5 0  2 0 0 8 0 0 
Snack  Crackers    2 2  2 5 2 1 2 2 
Soaps  1 1  1 2 1 1 1 1 
Soft  Drinks    5 1  1 4 3 3 3 2 
Tooth  Brushes    1 0  8 0 2 0 2 2 
Tooth  Pastes  6  10  18 8  10 0  12 3 
Average  4.9  4  5.9 3.8 4.2 4.3 4.8 5.2 
Median  3 2  3 2 2 2 2 3 
 
      
Table 7. Asymmetry Thresholds in Cents, First 12-Month Period of the Sample vs Last 12-Month Period of the Sample 
 
 Sample  Size  Threshold 
  First 12 Months  Last 12 Months  First 12 Months  Last 12 Months 
Analgesics  312,534 430,029  0  16 
Bath Soap  0 98,529  -  - 
Bathroom Tissues  111,584 165,986  2  4 
Bottled Juices  391,379 611,627  11  12 
Canned Soup   657,039 406,997  0  24 
Canned Tuna   290,860 203,939  3  2 
Cereals  550,364 672,046  0  13 
Cheeses   748,883 949,382  0  22 
Cookies   970,126 922,640  0  10 
Crackers   242,707 402,834  1  11 
Dish Detergent   266,158 308,769  0  15 
Fabric Softeners   243,900 299,302  0  1 
Front-end-candies   525,912 517,081  0  1 
Frozen Dinners   0 327,646  -  - 
Frozen Entrees   782,633 976,451  1  20 
Frozen Juices   236,961 306,801  1  13 
Grooming Products   0 1,010,036  -  - 
Laundry Detergents   347,556 376,475  1  6 
Oatmeal  0 168,849  -  - 
Paper Towels   100,437 119,194  1  4 
Refrigerated Juices  192,878 319,187  0  10 
Shampoos  0 1,209,605  -  - 
Snack Crackers   377,000 460,508  0  3 
Soaps  0 354,449  -  - 
Soft Drinks   918,306 1,890,469  0  0 
Tooth Brushes   226,573 238,089  0  1 
Tooth Pastes  317,591 424,639  1  2 
Average     1.1  9.1 
Median     0  10 
 
Note: 
In six product categories, the sample size was 0 for the first 12 months, and thus no comparison could be performed. 
 
      
Table 8. Asymmetry Thresholds in Cents for Products Whose Average Price during the First 
4 Weeks Was Higher than (or the Same as) the Average Price during the Last 4 Weeks 
 
 Threshold  
Analgesics  3  
Bath Soap  0  
Bathroom Tissues  5  
Bottled Juices  5  
Canned Soup   0  
Canned Tuna   1  
Cereals  14  
Cheeses   1  
Cookies   2  
Crackers   2  
Dish Detergent   5  
Fabric Softeners   1  
Front-end-candies   0  
Frozen Dinners   2  
Frozen Entrees   14  
Frozen Juices   9  
Grooming Products   2  
Laundry Detergents   12  
Oatmeal  2  
Paper Towels   2  
Refrigerated Juices  7  
Shampoos  0  
Snack Crackers   2  
Soaps  1  
Soft Drinks   1  
Tooth Brushes   3  
Tooth Pastes  10  
Average  3.9  
Median   2
 
      
Table 9. Variation in the Asymmetry Thresholds in Cents over the Business Cycle 
 
 Threshold  Sample  Size  
 Low   NBER  High-Chicago High-US  Low  NBER  High-Chicago  High-US  
Analgesics  16  0  8  8  290,098  243,554  275,751  271,589  
Bath Soap  0  --  0  0  66,850  --  29,693  40,445  
Bathroom Tissues  4  3  1  1  119,928  81,772  95,866  97,704  
Bottled Juices  12  2  6  6  396,630  296,436  398,069  400,885  
Canned Soup   12  0  1  1  270,074  480,363  510,137  513,003  
Canned Tuna   21  1  2  2  169,238  204,450  225,749  229,596  
Cereals  0  0  20  0  444,826  435,170  465,991  469,343  
Cheeses   29  0  1  1  640,023  545,066  590,552  594,712  
Cookies   19  1  8  6  629,269  658,658  720,327  724,924  
Crackers   11  1  1  1  267,978  184,937  198,575  194,353  
Dish Detergent   15  0  2  2  208,650  192,674  191,233  191,155  
Fabric Softeners   1  2  4  4  195,268  180,544  190,898  193,299  
Front-end-candies   16  1  1  1  339,746  391,849  409,466  414,510  
Frozen Dinners   5  --  7  3  219,267  --  52,357  104,752  
Frozen Entrees   19  0  10  8  666,595  595,097  626,024  627,971  
Frozen Juices   10  0  2  1  200,042  190,792  209,811  211,856  
Grooming Products   0  --  8  8  686,463  --  292,428  408,529  
Laundry Detergents   13  0  2  2  239,687  256,294  301,483  304,595  
Oatmeal  2  --  0  18  116,311  --  112,143  107,397  
Paper Towels   2  0  1  1  81,136  73,354  84,240  83,448  
Refrigerated Juices  15  0  10  1  207,171  149,588  177,756  176,872  
Shampoos  17  --  3  6  816,157  --  493,778  683,457  
Snack Crackers   3  0  2  2  309,361  297,408  301,817  304,149  
Soaps  12  --  1  1  226,417  --  183,734  214,697  
Soft Drinks   3  1  0  0  1,262,488 658,506  774,846  791,416  
Tooth Brushes   1  1  8  8  168,467  162,515  187,868  192,626  
Tooth Pastes  1  0  0  0  294,654  238,442  251,899  252,323  
Average   9.6  0.6  4.0  3.4        
Median   14         1 7 6
 
Note:   Low = Lowest Unemployment Rate Period for both Chicago and the U.S. 
NBER = NBER Recession Period 
High-Chicago = Highest Chicago Unemployment Rate Period 
High-US = Highest U.S. Unemployment Rate Period. 
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   Figure 1. Price of Frozen Concentrate Orange Juice, Heritage House, 12oz (UPC = 3828190029, Store 78), September 14, 1989–May 8, 1997
(Source: Dutta, et al., 2002, and Levy, et al., 2002).
Notes: (1) Week 1 = Week of September 14, 1989, and Week 399=Week of May 8, 1997.
(2) There are 6 missing observations in the series.
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Figure 3c. Frequency of Positive and Negative Price Changes in Cents by Category 
 
 





















In Figure R1 we present the cross-category average frequency of positive and negative 
price changes in cents for the low/zero-inflation period sample. 
 
In Figures R1.1a–R1.1c we present the frequency of positive and negative price changes 
in cents by categories for the low/zero-inflation period sample. 
 
In Figure R2 we present the cross-category average frequency of positive and negative 
price changes in cents for the deflation period sample. 
 
In Figures R2.1a–R2.1c we present the frequency of positive and negative price changes 
in cents by categories for the deflation period sample. 
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Figure R1. Average Frequency of Positive and Negative Price Changes
All 29 Categories, Low/Zero Inflation Period
Positive
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Figure R2. Average Frequency of Positive and Negative  Price Changes
All 29 Categories, Deflation Period
Positive
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